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P RELDUNARY HEMORANDUM 
September 30, 1985 Conference 
Summer List 1, Sheet 3 
No. 84-1839 
SCHIAVONE (alleged briber) e+ J4/ . 
v. 
FORTUNE, a.k.a. TIME, INC. 
Cert. to CA3 (Seitz, 
Becker, Rosenn) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs argue that Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure lS(c) should be interpreted to allow their 
amended complaint to relate back to the filing date of their 
original complaint so that their action will not be barred by the 
--------~---~----~----~~--~~ 
applicable statute of limitations. .. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELON: Petrs alleged that 
they were libeled in a ·Fortune Magazine cover story entitled 
"The Charges Against Reagan's Labor Secretary," which appeared 
in the May 31, 1982 issue. They filed complaints against 
"Fortune" on May 9, 1983. The statute of limitations ran 
on May 19, 1983. Petitioners served "Fortune" by mailing 
the complaints on May 20, 1983 to the New Jersey registered 
agent for Time, Inc. "Fortune" is a trademark and an internal 
division of Time, Inc., but has no separate legal identity. 
Time, Inc. received the complaints on May 23, 1983 but refused 
to accept service because the party named was not "Time, Inc." 
On July 19, 1983, petrs amended the complaints to name the 
defendant as "Fortune, also known as Time, Incorporated." 
The amended :complaints were served on July 21, 1983. 
The District Court granted Time's motion to dismiss 
based on the statute of limitations defense. It held that 
the amended complaints did not relate back to the original 
filing date because Time had not received notice of the action 
before the statute ran as required by rule lS(c). · Rule lS(c) allows 
an amendment ·changing the party to relate back to the original 
filing date if "the claim . . . ·asserted in the amended pleading 
arose out of the • . . transaction • • . set forth . . • in the 
original pleading [and] . . . the party to be brought in by 
amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of 
the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his 
defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, 
but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, 
the action would have been brought against him." Fed. R. Civ. 
P. lS(c). 
CA3 affirmed. It rejected petrs' argument that 
the amendment correcting the misnomer should not be considered 
a change of party for purposes of rule 15(c) because there was 
an identity of interest between the intended defendant and the 
defendant named in the original complaint. The court reasoned 
that "[t]here is no support in the rule or the advisory 
committee note for plaintiffs' proffered exception." The 
court then refused to rule that the amended complaint related 
back. It observed that there is a split in the circuits 
concerning the proper interpretation of rule 15(c). The 
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have literally applied 
rule 15(c) 's strict notice requirement. Cooper v. Postal 
Service, 740 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1984): Watson v. Unipress, 
Inc., 733 F.2d 1386, 1390 (lOth Cir. 1984): Hughes v. United 
States, 701 F.2d 56, 58 (7th Cir. 1983). See also Trace X 
Chemical, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Chemical Co., 724 ·F.2d 68, 70-71 
(8th Cir. 1983). The Second and Fifth Circuits have determined 
that the rule cannot be read literally to require notice to the 
substitute party within the statutory limitations period. 
Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1980); Ingram 
v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
440 U.S. 940 (1979). See also Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller Co., 
692 F.2d 403, 410 (6th Cir. 1982) (Jones, J., concurring). 
Though noting the appeal of the Second and Fifth Circuit's 
position "as a policy matter," the CA3 adopted the literal 
position because the language of rule 15(c) is "clear and 
unequivocal" and because "it is not this court's role to amend 
procedural rules in accordance with our own policy preferences." 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs argue that the Court should 
resolve the intercircuit conflict by adopting the nonliteral 
interpretation of rule 15(c). They would extend the notice 
period by the reasonable time allowed under the federal rules 
for service of process. 
Petrs also argue that an amendment changing parties 
should always relate back when there is an "identity of interests" 
between the misnamed and the correct party. 
4. DISCUSSION: There is clearly an intercircuit 
~ 
c~ on the proper interpretation of rule 15(c). But, 
in my opinion, the side on which the CA3 carne down has the 
better of the argument. There are certainly reasons favoring 
either formulation of the rule, but the CA3's interpretation 
is strongly supported b y the plain and unequivocal language of 
rule 15(c). Moreover, the trend seems to be in favor of the 
CA3's position and away from the original CA2 position. The 
conflict is also not such a serious one that this Court must 
resolve it. There is no basis in the rule or advisory notes 
for petrs' "identity of interests" exception to the ordinary 
rule that corrected misnomers are party changes within the 
meaning of rule 15(c). 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend denial. 
There is a response and a reply. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell February 7, 1986 
From: Bob 
No. 84-1839 RONALD A SCHIAVONE, et al. v. FORTUNE aka TIME, INC. 
Cert to CA3, set for argument Wednesday, February ~6, 1986 -
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Whether an amendment to correct misnomer of the defendant 
relates back under Rule 15(c), where the defendant to be brought 
in was notified of the action four days after the statute of lim-
~ - - ...... -::::::=-
i tat ions had expired, by timely service upon it of the process 
------------~ 
issued in the name used for the defendant in the complaint. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Petrs alleged that they were libeled in a cover story enti-
tled "The Charges Against Reagan's Labor Secretary" which ap-
peared in the May 31, 1982 issue of Fortune Magazine. Complaints 
page 2.~ 
,tJ~~ 
against "Fortune" were ~d by the petrs on May 9, 1983~ Sub-
stantial distribution of that issue of Fortune was held to have ~ 
occurred on May 19, 1982 at the latest. The New Jersey statute ~ 
of limitations for libel (one year) expired on May 19, 1983~ ------- -------------~--~---
the latest. On May 20, 1983 petrs served "Fortune" by mailing 
the party named was not "Time, Inc." On July 19, 1983 petrs 
amended the complaints to name the defendant as "Fortune, also 
known as Time, Incorporated." The amended complaints were served 
~ 
by certified mail on July 21, 1983. The District Court granted 
Time's motion to dismiss, based upon _t~ statu~f J i mJ; tations 
---------~ ~ 
defense and held that the amended complaints did not relate back 
to the original filing date because Time had received notice of ~#"U....6 (-
~k_ 
the institution of the action after May 19, 1983, the date of the . 
running of the statute of limitations. The Third Circuit af-
firmed. 
II. DISCUSSION 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) provides: 
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, 
or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in 
the original pleading, the amendment relates back to 
the date of the original plea~1ng.- ~n amendment chang-
ing the par~insf whom a claim is asserted ~ates 
back i_~he foregoing provision is satisfied an~ith­
in the- period provided by law for commencing the action 
"@inst him, the party to ~~ brought in by amendment 
r has rece•ived uch11notice of the institution of the 
action t e i no e re 'udiced in maintaining 
his defense on the mer1ts, and ( ew or should have 
'· r 
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known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity 
of the proper party, the action would have been brought 
against him. 
The advisory committee note makes clear that "Rule 15(c) is 
amplified to state more clearly when an amendment of a pleading 
changing the party against whom a claim is asserted (including an 
amendment to correct a misnomer or misdescription of a defendant) 
shall 'relate back' to the date of the original pleading." Thus, 
it is clear that petrs' mistaken naming of Time, Inc., as For-
---------~---------~~c,•c-~--~----~----~-=-c~~------·~----~ 
tune, brings the later amendment within Rule 15(c). 
~ c::: 5 ?Qa -::a& ::S.. e c:;l' ~A '--"""' 
Petrs' task is to persuade this Court that the literal lan-
guage of the rule should be ignored. Although there is much to 
commend petrs' view that the rule should permit relation back in 
a situation such as that in the case at bar, I do not believe any 
of their arguments are so strong that this Court should stray 
from the plain language of the rule. 
Petrs argue that the phrase "within the period provided by 
law for commencing the action" should be read to include a rea-
~~----------------~ ~ sonable time for service of process after the running of the 
statute of limitations. The thrust of petrs' argument is that 
because service to a correctly named defendant is permissible in 
the first instance after the statute of limitations has run, such 
notice should also be allowed to a party who has incorrectly 
named a defendant. Petrs first argue that the history surround-
ing the 1966 amendment to rule 15 (c), which added the language 
relevant to this case, supports their argument, but I disagree. 
\ 
All parties agree that the impetus for the 1966 amendment to rule \ 
lS(c) came from an article in Harvard Law Review by Clark Byse. 
page 4. 
That article recounted the tale of four district court cases in 
which citizens were attempting to sue the government. In each 
case, the plaintiff named the wrong government officer. In one 
case, for example, the plaintiff named a Secretary of HEW who had 
been replaced just nineteen days prior to the filing of the law-
suit. By the time the plaintiff had amended his complaint, the 
statute of limitations had run. In such a case the court did not 
permit the bringing of this "new" action beyond the limitations 
period. In disagreeing with the results in these cases, and in 
proposing a solution, Professor Byse noted: 
"The objective of the sixty-day [statute of limi-
tations] is to require the disappointed [social securi-
ty] claimant to give timely notice to a government of-
ficial or agency of the Government that the claimant is 
seeking judicial reversal of the denial of his applica-
tion for benefits under the Social Security Act. If 
this objective would not be frustrated or impeded by 
permitting a plaintiff to amend his pleadings to bring 
in the proper defendant, it is difficult to see why the 
amendment should not be permitted." 
~se, S u i n g the " Wrong " "_::.D..:::e..::f-=e;.;:.n.:...;d~a::..;n=t__;l::..:. n:..::.__...:J....:u::..d=.i .=;c.:;i..:::a:.::;l;__.::...R-=e-=v-=i:...:e=..;w~.....:o~f 
Federal Administrative Action: Proposals for Reform, 77 Harv. L. 
Rev • 4 0 , 4 6 ( 19 6 3 ) . Thus, Professor Byse was concerned about 
the applicable limitations period, and whether 
there in fact had been proper notice in the District Court cases 
he was discussing. His article is simply not helpful in assess-
-------
ing the narrow issuer before the Court in this case, which is 
whether notice given after the statute of limitations period has 
run should suffice for purposes of Rule 15 (c) in light of plain 
language to the contrary in the rule itself. Similarly, the four 
district court cases about which Professor Byse spoke did not 
page 5. 
address the issue--and their holdings and the criticism they pro-
voked do not address the narrow issue before the court. In addi-
tion, contrary to petrs' claim~Professor Kaplan never explicitly 
endorsed petrs' view. The only conclusion to be drawn from the 
historical argument is that no one expressly considered the pre-
cise issue before the Court in this case. Petrs' "historical" 
argument, in sum, is nothing but a restatement of their argument 
here, that it would be logical to allow relation back where the 
party has notice within the time the federal 
rules even though the statute of limitations has run. 
That argument has some logical appeal. If the federal rules ---permit actual notice of an action after the statute of limi ta----tions has begun, what difference does it make that the action in 
one case was filed against a correctly named defendant within the 
statute of limitations period, and in the other case it was not. 
The theoretical answer is that by filing within the statute of 
limitations period, a properly named defendant is put on con-
structive notice of the claim against him, whereas when there is 
an improperly named defendant there is neither constructive nor 
actual notice of the suit within the limitations period. This 
theoretical explanation may not convince me, were I drafting a 
rule from scratch, that actual notice to the misnamed defendant 
must take place within the limitations period, but in the face of 
the rule's clearly drafted provision, I do not think that peti-
tioner's argument should call for deviation from the language of 
the rule. 
page 6. 
Petrs then ask the Court to draw an exception simply in sit-
uations in which there is an "identity of interest" between the 
party named and the intended party as in this case. Petrs argue 
that even if the rule is construed in the case of suit against a 
wrong defendant to require actual notice within the limitations 
period, such a view makes no sense in the misnomer context as it 
exists here because the party petitioner intended to sue got the 
identical notice it would have had it been correctly named origi-
nally. First, it is not clear to me what logical basis exists 
for carving out this particular exception. Second, petrs attempt 
to draw support for their identity of interest exception by say-
ing that prior the 1966 amendment to rule 15(c), relation back 
was allowed so long as the party who shared the identity of in-
terest was on notice. Once again, petrs extrapolate and claim 
that because notice would in some situations been allowed after 
the expiration of the statute of limitations, relation back in 
all likelihood was allowed when notice came after the statute of 
limitations had passed. Petrs cite no case in which this oc-
curred; indeed, given that the language relative to the statute 
of limitations is found for the first time in the rule, it would 
be surprising to find the issue discussed in any such case. Fi-
nally, it is not at all clear that any pre-amendment case would 
be at all persuasive as against the argument that the amended 
rule is clear on its face. To be sure, the "identity of inter-
est" theory may have some vitality in a case such as the present 
where service on Time, Inc. of a complaint naming Fortune is de-
page 7. 
livered prior to the running of the statute of limitations, but 
that is not this case. 
On a more theoretical plain, one may argue, as petrs' seem 
to on p. 16, that filing of a complaint naming Fortune, put Time, 
Inc. on constructive notice within the limitations period. Such 
a reading of the notice requirement would obviate the need for 
rule 15(c) in misnomer cases, because all actions must begin with 
a timely filed complaint, in filing states. Second, such a view 
would fictionalize the notice concept, which does not appear to 
be contemplated by the rule. See Note, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(c): Relation Back of Amendments, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 83 
(1972). 
Finally, petrs contend that the court should decide the case 
in the spirit of Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 which declares that the rules 
"shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action." I think that the important word 
in the above is "construed." If the Court were able to rewrite 
rules under the guise of "construing" them, in cases such as this 
when the language could not be clearer, then it is inviting lower 
courts to do the same. 
I am also not convinced that an affirmance should be criti-
cized as blind adherence to literalism. There is no manifest 
injustice that results in a case such as this when a plaintiff 
-------------------~ ~~-----
fails to determine the proper party to be sued, and waits for the~ 
last possible minute to sue. In addition, I am not convinced 
that a holding in favor of petrs might not open up other cans of 
worms so as to transform rule 15 from a relatively straightfor-
page 8. 
ward device for dealing with the relation back of amendments into 
a fertile ground for further litigation. For example, an excep-
tion based solely on the "identity of interest" principle may 
create an incentive for parties to squabble over the contours of 
that doctrine. Further, although this is not argued by respond-
ent, I am concerned that a holding that notice within the period 
prescribed by law plus a reasonable time for service under the 
federal rules, might spawn additional litigation in states where 
the action is deemed commenced by the service of process, because 
there would then be confusion whether a holding based on the fed-
eral rules 1 view that actual notice can take place after the 
statute of limitations has run should permit relation back even 
in a service state when there is no notice until a period of time 
after the running of the statute of limitations. Upon further 
reflection these last two concerns may not turn about to be all 
that substantial; yet, just raising them supports a view that 
changes in rules should take place in the rule writing process 
where the ramifications of such changes can be carefully consid-
ered and commented upon, and not by a court under the guise of 
"construing" a rule. I am sympathetic to petrs 1 admonition that 
the Rules of Civil Procedure favor resolution of disputes on the 
merits. I do not, however, think that that principle should be 
carried so far as to rewrite perfectly clear rules. 
Finally, it is worth noting that as respondent points out 
many courts of appeals have read rule 15 (c) 1 iter ally, wh~eas 
~ ------------------
two (CA2, 5) have adopted petrs 1 view. From the cases cited by 




eluding the case at bar, that have rejected a request not to read 
the rule literally with respect to notice within the statute of 
limitations period. In fairness to petrs it should be pointed out 
for purposes of accuracy that in none of the circuit court cases 
cited by respondent on pp. 29 and 30 of its brief, did a court 
directly confront and reject the narrow "identity of interest" 
exception suggested by petrs here. Indeed, those cases generally 
did not involve "misnomer" cases such as the case at bar, wherein 
the proper party was served with a pleading containing the wrong 
name. Only the CAS case, Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404 (1980), 
bears a resemblance to the facts here. Four cases cited by re-
spondent, for example, have involved suits against government 
agencies, wherein a party then seeks to add an additional offi-
cer, agency, or the United States itself. Weisgal v. Smith, No. 
84-6582, slip op. (CA4 1985); Cooper v. u.s. Postal Service, 740 
F.2d 714 (CA9 1984), cert. denied, ___ u.s. ___ ; Hughes v. United 
States, 701 F.2d 56 (CA7 1982); Stewart v. United States, 655 
F.2d 741 (CA 7 1981). Another has involved the use of John Doe 
defendants, with replacement later on by amendment. Watson v. 
Unipress, Inc., 733 F.2d (CA 10 1984). Indeed, in Archuelata v. 
Duffy's Inc., 471 F.2d 33 (lOth Cir. 1973), the court applied 
rule 15(c) in a straightforward literal manner, and in declining 
to find a mere misnomer in the case before it, because a totally 
separate corporate entity had been sued, noted that it would 
"allow misnomers to be amended and relate back as a matter of 
course." Id., at 35. It is not clear exactly what this would 
mean in the context of the case at bar, but it suggests the~-
page 10. 
sibility that courts might look differently on such a case, al-
though I stick to my conclusion that they should not do so, espe-
cially in light of the fact that the Advisory Committee Note ex-
pressly includes "misnomers" within the concept of a change of 
party. 
III. CONCLUSION 
A case like this in the end is probably a judgment call. Of 
course, this Court could incorporate into the rule the change 
suggested by petrs. I am persuaded, however, that any sue~ 
change should come in the rule writing process.~ecommend that 
for the 
Third Circuit and apply the rule to this case as it is written. 
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From: Justice Blackmun 
APR 2 4 1ao . 
Circulated: ~e 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1839 
RONALD A. SCHIAVONE, GENARO LIQUORI AND 
JOSEPH A. DICAROLIS, PETITIONER v. FOR-
TUNE, AKA TIME, INCORPORATED 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1986] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case primarily concerns Rule 15(c) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and its application to a less-than-
precise denomination of a defendant in complaints filed in fed-
eral court near the expiration of the period of limitations. 
Because of an apparent conflict among the Courts of Ap-
peals,1 we granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1985). 
I 
The three petitioners instituted this diversity litigation on 
May 9, 1983, by filing their respective complaints in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. 
Each complaint alleged that the plaintiff was libeled in a 
cover story entitled "The Charges Against Reagan's Labor 
Secretary," which appeared in the May 31, 1982, issue of For-
tune magazine. The caption of each complaint named "For-
'Compare, e. g., Cooper v. U. S. Postal Service, 740 F. 2d 714, 716 
(CA91984), cert. denied,- U. S.- (1985); Watson v. Unipress, Inc. , 
733 F. 2d 1386, 1390 (CAlO 1984); Hughes v. United States, 701 F. 2d 56, 
58 (CA7 1982); and Trace X Chemical, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Chemical Co., 724 
F. 2d 68, 70-71 (CA81983), with Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F. 2d 404, 408 (CA5 
1980); Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F. 2d 566, 571-572 (CA2 1978), cert. denied, 
440 U. S. 940 (1979); and Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller Co., 692 F. 2d 403, 
410 (CA6 1982) (concurring opinion). 
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tune," without embellishment, as the defendant. See App. 
8. In its paragraph 2, each complaint described Fortune as 
"a foreign corporation having its principal offices at Time and 
Life Building, Sixth Avenue and 50th Street, New York, 
New York 10020." ld., at 9. "Fortune," however, is only a 
trademark and the name of an internal division of Time, In-
corporated (Time), a New York corporation. 2 
On May 20, petitioners' counsel mailed the complaints to 
Time's registered agent in New Jersey. They were received 
by the agent on May 23. The agent refused service because 
Time was not named as a defendant. 
On July 19, 1983, each petitioner amended his complaint to 
name as the captioned defendant "Fortune, also known as 
Time, Incorporated," and, in the body of the complaint, tore-
fer to "Fortune, also known as Time, Incorporated," as a 
New York corporation with a specified registered New J er-
sey agent. See App. 25, 26. The amended complaints were 
served on Time by certified mail on July 21. 
Time moved to dismiss the amended complaints. The Dis-
trict Court granted those motions. ld., at 96, 98, 100. It 
ruled that the complaints, as amended, adequately named 
Time as a defendant, and therefore were not to be dismissed 
"for failure of capacity of defendant to be sued." Supp. App. 
to Pet. for Cert. 18. Under New Jersey law, however, see 
N. J. Stat. Ann. 2A:14-3 (West 1952), a libel action must be 
commenced within one year of the publication of the alleged 
libel. 3 Supp. App. to Pet. for Cert. 18. State law also pro-
vides that the "'date upon which a substantial distribution oc-
curs triggers the statute of limitations for any and all actions 
arising out of that publication," id., at 19, quoting MacDon-
ald v. Time, Inc., Civil No. 81-479 (DNJ Aug. 25, 1981). 
2 No claim is made that Fortune is a separate legal entity with the ca-
pacity to be sued. 
3 The cited New Jersey statute reads: 
"Every action at law for libel or slander shall be commenced within 1 
year next after the publication of the alleged libel or slander. " 
84-1839--0PINION 
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Supp. App. to Pet. for Cert. 19.4 The court found it unnec-
essary, for purposes of the motion, to determine the precise 
date the statute of limitations had begun to run. 
Although Time acknowledged that the original filings were 
within the limitations period, it took the position that it could 
not be named as a party after the period had expired. Time 
contended that a party must be substituted within the limita-
tions period in order for the amendment to relate back to the 
original filing date pursuant to Rule 15(c). 5 
The District Court concluded that the amendments to the 
complaints did not relate back to the filing of the original 
complaints because it had not been shown that Time received 
notice of the institution of the suits within the period pro-
vided by law for commencing an action against it. Supp. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 23. It therefore "with great reluc-
tance" granted the motion to dismiss, noting that any dis-
missal of a claim based upon the statute of limitations "by its 
very nature is arbitrary." /d., at 24. The court also ruled 
that the "equities of this situation" did not demand that relief 
4 The court noted that, despite the magazine's cover date of May 31, 
1982, the record "indicate[ d)" that, for purposes of determining the limita-
tions period, publication "occurred substantially before" May 31; that sub-
scription copies were mailed May 12 and received by subscribers May 
13-19; that newsstand copies went on sale May 17; that a press release was 
issued May 11; and that copies of the magazine were mailed to represent-
atives of the press on that date. Supp. App. to Pet. for Cert. 19. 
5 Rule 15(c) provides in pertinent part: 
"Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose 
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be 
set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date 
of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom 
a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, 
within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, 
the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the 
institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his 
defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a 
mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have 
been brought against him." 
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be afforded to petitioners. Ibid. The identity of the pub-
lisher of Fortune was readily ascertainable from the maga-
zine itself. It rejected petitioners' contention that Time de-
liberately misled them to believe that Fortune was a separate 
corporation. It observed that petitioners created the risk by 
filing their suits close to the end of the limitations period. 
Id., at 25. 
Petitioners moved for reconsideration. By letter opinion 
filed January 12, 1984, the court adhered to its prior ruling. 
App. to Brief in Opposition 1. 
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, the three actions were consolidated. That 
court affirmed the orders of the District Court. 750 F. 2d 15 
(1984). It ruled that the New Jersey statute of limitations 
ran "on May 19, 1983, at the latest," for a "substantial distri-
bution" of the issue of May 31, 1982, had "occurred on May 
19, 1982, at the latest." Id., at 16. It regarded the lan-
guage of Rule 15(c) as "clear and unequivocal." 750 F. 2d, at 
18. It also said: "While we are sympathetic to plaintiffs' ar-
guments, we agree with the defendant that it is not this 
court's role to amend procedural rules in accordance with our 
own policy preferences." Ibid. It further held that the pe-
riod within which the defendant to be brought in must re-
ceive notice under Rule 15(c) does not include the time avail-
able for service of process. 
II 
It is clear, from what has been noted above, that the three 
complaints as originally drawn were filed within the limita-
tions period; that service was attempted only after that pe-
riod had expired; and that the amendment of the complaints, 
and the service of the complaints as so amended, also neces-
sarily took place after the expiration of the limitations period. 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals so found, and we 
have no reason to disagree. The parties themselves do not 
dispute these facts. Instead, their dispute centers on 
.. 
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whether Time was sufficiently named as the defendant in the 
original complaints so that the service that was attempted 
after the 1-year period but within the time allowed for serv-
ice after the complaints' filing was effective, and on whether, 
in any event, the amendment of the complaints related back 
to the original filing and accomplished the same result. 
Petitioners argue that Rule 15(c)'s present form came into 
being by amendment in 1966 for the express purpose of allow-
ing :relation back of a change in the name or identity of a de-
fendant when, although the limitations period for filing had 
run, the period allowed by Rule 4 for timely service had not 
yet expired. Brief for Petitioners 5. The Rule was 
effected, it is said, to ameliorate literal and rigid application 
of limitations periods to both claim and party amendments. 
It is urged that the Rules of Civil Procedure should be ap-
plied and construed to yield just determinations, that is, 
determinations on the merits, and that a procedural "double 
standard" that bars relation back for late notice to a new de-
fendant when a like notice to the original defendant would be 
timely is unacceptable. Petitioners further argue that the 
original party named here and the party sought to be substi-
tuted had such commonality of interest that notice to one was 
in fact notice to the other. Therefore, it is said, where the 
intended defendant was misdesignated in form only, and 
knew or reasonably should have known that it was the true 
target and received the same notice it would have received 
had the form been flawless, "relation back should be a fore-
gone conclusion." Brief for Petitioners 6. 
Respondent, of course, takes issue with this approach. It 
claims that the language of Rule 15(c) is clear and that proper 
notice of the institution of these actions was not received by it 
within the period of limitations. It asserts that the equities 
do not support petitioners' position, and that the interpreta-
tion of Rule 15(c) urged by petitioners in effect would be an 
impermissible rewriting of the Rule by this Court. 
... . 
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III 
As amended, Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure states: "These rules . . . shall be construed to secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 
Rule 8(f) says: "All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice." And Justice Black reminded us, more 
than 30 years ago, in connection with an order adopting re-
vised rules of this Court, that the "principal function of proce-
dural rules should be to serve as useful guides to help, not 
hinder, persons who have a legal right to bring their prob-
lems before the courts." 346 U. S. 945, 946 (1954). 
This Court, too, in the early days of the federal civil proce-
dure rules, when Rule 15(c), seen. 5, supra, consisted only of 
what is now its first sentence, announced that the spirit and 
inclination of the rules favored decisions on the merits, and 
rejected an approach that pleading is a game of skill in which 
one misstep may be decisive. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 
41, 48 (1957). It also said that decisions on the merits are 
not to be avoided on the basis of "mere technicalities." 
Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178, 181 (1962). 
Despite these worthy goals and loftily stated purposes, we 
conclude that the judgments of the Court of Appeals in the 
present cases were correct. 
A 
The defendant named in the caption of each of the original 
complaints was "Fortune," and Fortune was described in the 
body of the complaint as "a foreign corru.v;ation" having prin-
cipal offices in the Time and Life Building in New York City. 
It also was alleged that Fortune was engage in e publica-
tion of a magazine of that name. Attached to the complaint 
were a copy of the magazine's cover for its issue of May 31, 
1982, an artist's depiction of an alleged payoff, and the text of 
parts of the article about which petitioners complained. The 
focus, as pleaded, was on Fortune. 
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We cannot understand why, in litigation of this asserted 
magnitude, Time was Mtiramed specifically as the defendant 
in the caption and in the bod of each com lamt. T is was 
not a situation where the ascertainment of the defendant's 
identity was difficult for the plaintiffs. An examination of ( t-b 
the magazine's masthead clearly would have revealed the cor- r £---
porate entity responsible for the publication. 6 
Petitioners nonetheless rely on Fortune's status as a divi-
sion of Time to argue that institution of an action purportedly 
against the former constituted notice of the action to the lat-
ter, as a related entity. Some Courts of Appeals have recog-
nized an "identity-of-interest" exce tion under which an 
amen ment t at substitutes a party in a complaint after the 
limitations period has expired will relate back to the date of 
the filing of the original complaint. 7 The Court of Appeals in 
this case re · e ed that a roach. The object of the excep-
tion is to avoid t e application of the statute of limitations 
6 The magazine's ve~tion, that of May 31, 1982, p. 2, 
recites: 
"FORTUNE (ISSN 0015-8259), May 31, 1982, Vol. 105, No. 11. Issued 
biw~ !!!,c., 3435 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, Cal. 9001~ .. 
Principal ofnces:""'Time & Life Building, Rockefeller Center, New York, 
N. Y. 10020. . . . FORTUNE is a registered mar of Time 
Incorporated." 
The parailel information set forth in current issues of Fortune magazine 
reads: 
"FORTUNE (ISSN 0015-8259). Published biweekly, with three issues in 
October, by Time Inc., 10880 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 
90024-4193. Time Inc. principal office: Time & Life Building, Rockefeller 
Center, New York, NY 10020-1393. . . . FORTUNE is a registered 
mark of Time Inc." 
See issue of Apr. 16, 1986, p. 4; issue of Mar. 31, 1986, p. 4; issue of Mar. 
17, 1986, p. 4. 
7 See, e. g., Travelers Indemnity Co. v. United States, ex rel . Construc-
tion Specialties Co., 382 F. 2d 103 (CAlO 1967); Montalvo v. Tower Life 
Building, 426 F. 2d 1135 (CA5 1970); Korn v. Royal Carribean Cruise 
Line, Inc., 724 F. 2d 1397 (CA9 1984). 
-
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when no prejudice would result to the party sought to be 
added. 
Even if we were to adopt the identity-of-interest excep-
tion, and even if Fortune properly could be named as a de-
fendant, we would be compelled to re · ect eti · oners' onten-
tion that the facts of this case fall within the exception. 
Timely filmg ofaco-mpfamt, andwtice within the limitations 
period to the party named in the complaint, permits imputa-
tion of notice to a subsequently named and sufficiently re-
lated party. In this case, however, neither Fortune nor { 
Time received notice of the filin until a er e · od of limi-
tations ad run. hus, there was no proper notice to For-
tun~ be imputed to Time. See Hernandez Jime-
nez v. Calero Toledo, 604 F. 2d 99, 102-103 (CAl 1979); 
Norton v. International Harvester Co., 627 F. 2d 18, 20-21 
(CA7 1980). 
The demands of orderly federal procedure require more 
than what was present in these cases. To accept the original 
complaints as properly identifying Time as the defendant 
would open wide the door to careless and inaccurate plead-
ing. The burden of correct identification must be on the 
plaintiff; the burden of overcoming misidentification should 
not be on the defendant. We conclude that for a defendant 
to be brought into a case, more than haphazard description of 
the kind evidenced by these complaints as originally drawn is 
necessary. 
We do not regress to the unmourned days of meticulous 
pleading, with every misstep fatal, when we so rule. Liber-
ality in construing pleadings cannot be taken so far as to evis-
cerate basic requirements of fair judicial process. Fairness 
to defendants demands some measure of accuracy greater 
than that displayed here. 
B 
The complaints as they were amended, of course, meet the 
identification standard. While the statement, "Fortune, 
also known as Time, Incorporated, was and is a corporation 
84-1839--0PINION 
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of the state of New York," is not a model of accuracy, it does 
focus on Time and sufficiently describes Time as the targeted 
defendant. The next question, the.!:!J is ~hether tne amend- ( 
ment, made in July 1983, rel~j>_ac~ .~ ~e filjn~9, 
a date concededly within the period of the applicable New 
Jersey statute of limitations. 
Central to the resolution of this issue is the language of 
Rule 15(c). See n. 5, supra. ReJation b~ck is dependent 
upon fo!,!r factors, all of which must be satisfied: (1) the basic 
claim must have arisen out of the conduct set forth in the 
original pleading; (2) the party to be brought in must have re-
ceived such notice that 1t WI no be re udiced in maintain-
ing i s e ense; (3) that party must or should have known 
that, but for a mistake concerning identity, the action would 
have been brought against it; and (4) the second and third re-
quirements must have been fulfilled within the prescribed 
limitations period. We are not concerned here with the first . 
factor, but we are concerned with the satisfaction of the re-
maining three. 
The first intimation that Time had of the institution and 
maintenance of the three suits took place a!}gLMay 19, 1983, 
the date the Court of Appeals said the statuteran "at the lat-
est." 750 F. 2d, at 16. Only on May 20 did petitioners' 
counsel mail the complaints to Time's registered agent in 
New Jersey. Only on May 23 were those complaints re-
ceived by the rei!stered gent, and ~sed. - Only on 
July 1 each petitioner amend his complaint. And only 
on July 21 were the amended complaints served on Time. 
It seems to us inevitably to follow that notice to Time and 
the necessary knowledge did not come into being "within the 
period provided by law for commencing the action against" 
Time, as is so clearly required by Rule 15(c). That occurred 
only after the expiration of the applicable 1-year period. 
This is fatal, then, to petitioners' litigation. 
We do not have before us a choice between a "liberal" ap-
proach toward Rule 15(c), on the one hand, and a "technical" 
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interpretation of the Rule, on the other hand. The choice, 
instead, is between recognizing or ignoring what the Rule 
provides in plain language. We accept the Rule as meaning 
what it says. 
We are not inclined, either, to temper the plain meaning of 
the language by engrafting upon it an extension of the limita-
tions period equal to the asserted reasonable time, inferred 
from Rule 4, for the service of a timely filed complaint. Rule 
4 deals only with process. Rule 3 concerns the "commence-
ment" of a civil action. Under Rule 15(c), the emphasis is 
upon "the period provided by law for commencing the action 
against" the defendant. An action is commenced by the fil-
ing of a complaint and, so far as Time is concerned, no com-
plaint against it was filed on or prior to May 19, 1983. 
Any possible doubt about this should have been dispelled 
20 years ago by the Advisory Committee's 1966 Note about 
Rule 15(c). The Note specifically states that the Rule's 
phrase "within the period provided by law for commencing 
the action" means "within the applicable limitations period": 
"An amendment changing the party against whom a 
claim is asserted relates back if the amendment satisfies 
the usual condition of Rule 15(c) of'arising out ofthe con-
duct ... set forth ... in the original pleading,' and if, 
within the applicable limitations period, the party 
brought in by amendment, first, received such notice of 
the institution of the action-the notice need not be for-
mal-that he would not be prejudiced in defending the 
action, and, second, knew or should have known that the 
action would have been brought against him initially had 
there not been a mistake concerning the identity of the 
proper party" (emphasis supplied). Advisory Commit-
tee's Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15, 28 U. S. C. 
App., p. 551; 39 F. R. D. 83. 
Although the Advisory Committee's comments do not fore-
close judicial consideration of the Rule's validity and mean-
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Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U. S. 438, 
444 (1946). 
The commentators have accepted the literal meaning of the 
significant phrase in Rule 15(c) and have agreed with the Ad-
visory Committee's Note. See 3 J. Moore, Federal Practice, 
§ 15.15[4.-2], p. 15-225 (2nd ed. 1985) ("the Rule demands a 
showing that, within the period of limitations, the new party 
.... "); 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure § 1498, p. 228 (Supp. 1985) ("in order for an amendment 
adding a party to relate back under Rule 15(c) the party to be 
added must have received notice of the action before the stat-
ute of s run"). 
The incQ.pin is notice and notice within the limitations pe-
riod. Of course, t ere is an element of arbitrariness here, 
but that is a characteristic of any limitations period. And it 
is an arbitrariness imposed by the legislature and not by the 
judicial process. See Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
15(c): Relation Back of Amendments, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 83, 
85, n. 8 (1972). 8 
The judgments of the Court of Appeals are affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
8 Petitioners would garner support from Professor Clark Byse's article, 
Suing the "Wrong" Defendant in Judicial Review of Federal Adminis-
trative Action: Proposals for Reform, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1963), cited in 
the Advisory Committee's Note to the 1966 amendment of Rule 15, 28 
U. S. C. App., p. 550; 39 F. R. D. 83. That study was critically directed 
at four federal district court decisions concerning "relation back" in suits 
against government officers. In each of the cases, however, the Govern-
ment within the period of limitations was on notice of the claim. 
Similarly, petitioners' reliance upon JUSTICE WHITE's footnote comment 
in dissent from the denial of certiorari in Cooper v. United States Postal 
Service, -- U. S. --, --, n. 2 (1985), seems to us to be misplaced. 
JUSTICE WHITE, in fact, noted the inherent weakness of any such reliance 
("Petitioners' position is somewhat weak in this regard because, while the 
complaint was filed within the requisite 30 days, no party was served with 
process within that period"). 
CHAMISERS 01'" 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.tbprtmt ~ltUrl "f tift ~ttb .!'taft• 
••~htn. ~. <If. 2!Tbi'l-~ 
April 24, 1986 
Re: 84-1839 - Schiavone v. Fortune, 
aka Time, Incorporated 
Dear Harry: 
During the oral argument, counsel for Time, 
Incorporated acknowledged that their legal position 
would have been the same if the complaint ha{l 
incorrectly named "Time, Inc." instead of using the 
correct corporate name. Your opinion does not seem 
to accept this formalistic view, but rather holds 
that "fairness to defendants" requires something 
"more than haphazard description of the kind 
evidenced by these complaints as originally drawn." 
Opinion at page 8. 
At the end of your opinion you state that the 
"linchpin is notice, and notice within the 
limitations period." In the context of this case, 
that sentence would be fully consistent with the 
argument advanced by Time, because even a misspelling 
would not put a defendant on notice within the 
limitations period given the time sequence in this 
case. 
As you will recall, I voted the other way at 
Conference and therefore expect to write in dissent. 
I must confess, however, that I am not sure whether I 
should be criticizing the majority for drawing a 
hyper-technical distinction between "Time, 
Incorporated" and "Time, Inc." or similar trivial 
misnomers, on the one hand, or for adopting a 
standard that is not explained because your opinion 
provides no guidance whatsoever on the degree to 
which a misdescription would be too haphazard to be 
acceptable. If the standard really is "fairness to 
the defendants," the opinion does not explain why 
this complaint gave Time, Incorporated any less 
notice that it was being sued than it would have 
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given if it had simply misspelled the defendant's 
name. 
In all events, I shall be writing in dissent and 
probably will criticize your draft both because it 
seems to adopt the sporting theory of litigation that 
Roscoe Pound criticized and also because it will 
invite lots of litigation concerning your "more than 
haphazard description" standard. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
,ju.vuw ~oud ltf l4t ~ittb ~bdt.G' 
Jlulfington.~. ~· 2ll,?'!~ 
April 24, 1986 
No. 84-1839 Schiavone v. Time, Inc. 
Dear Harry, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.hprmu arourt &tf tlf~ ~nitta .Statts 
JruJri:n:ghttt~ J. ar. 2llbi"-~ 
Re: No. 84-1839, Schiavone v. Fortune 
Dear John: 
April 25 1986 
Thank you for your letter of April 24. I anticipated your 
dissent because your vote was that way and because your 
questions from the bench during oral argument were in that 
direction. 
I think that you and those who are with you in this case 
will agree that it would be impossible--and surely inadvisable--
in one opinioil,.,.to cover every situation of careless pleading. 
As a result, the proposed opinion attempts to decide this case 
while leaving some elbowroom for others. I thought that the 
comments near the bottom of page 8 and at the top of page 9 
pointed in this direction and were not mere proclamations. You, 
of course, will disagree. By all means, write as you wish, for 
that, I suppose, is what this Court is all about. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMB E R S OF 
,jttptnnt Clf!tnrlltf tlrt ,-mt~ .jtaft.tr 
JfaglfingUm. ~. C!J. 20~,.~ 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
April 25, 1986 
84-1839 - Schiavone v. Fortune 
Dear Harry, 
I shall await the dissent. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.uprtmt <!ftturt of tlyt )lnittb ~tatt. 
'llht•lyinghm. ~. <!f. 2llp~~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL April 25, 1986 
Re: No. 84-1839 - Schiavone v. Fortune 
Dear Harry: 




cc: The Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS Of' 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.hprtm.t Clfanri rl .tJrt ~b _ttattg 
.,..Jringbtn. !J. Of. 2llp'!~ 
April 25, 1986 
No. 84-1839 
Schiavone, et al. 
v. Fortune, a/k/a-TTme, Inc 
Dear Harry, 
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April 28, 1986 
84-1839 Schiavone v. Fortune 
Dear Harry: 










.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
Re: No. 84-1839 
Dear Harry, 
Please join me. 
Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
.iuprttttt <!Jltltri l1f tlrt ~tb .itatt• 
jilt*Jrington. ~. <!J. 20~,.~ 
April 28, 





.inpumt <!fO'ttrl O'f tlrt Jlnittb .jtates-
~Jringtlln. !l. <If. 21lbi~~ 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 5, 1986 
84-1839 - Schiavone v. Fortune 
Dear John, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Stevens 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
ilnprtntt <!fami Df tlrt~b iltatt• 
Jfuqinght~ ~. <!f. 2tlgi'l~ 
June 10, 1986 
84-1839 - Ronald Schiavone, Genaro Liquori and 
Joseph DiCarolis v. Fortune, aka Time, Inc. 
Dear John: 
I join your dissent. 
Regards, 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
.;lnpumt QJomt gf tift ~b .jbdts 
JhwJriughtn. ~. OJ. 21l.;T'l' 
CHAMI!lE~S O F" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 13, 1986 
Re: 84-1839 - Schiavone, et al. v. 
Fortune, aka Time 
Dear Harry: 
As I mentioned before Conference yesterday, I 
enjoyed the first line of your golden shiner opinion 
because it gives us a chance to laugh when we are 
really too busy to think about what is happening with 
our most pressing problem:>. I trust that you will 
accept the following criticism in the spirit in which 
it is offered. 
In the opinion for the Court in this case, you 
expressed bewilderment as to how a busy lawyer could 
possibly misname the defendant in litigation of this 
asserted magnitude. See p. 7. I have the same lack 
of understanding as to how such a careful craftsman 
as the author of the Court opinion in this case could 
possibly have misnamed the party--you will note that 
your caption names •Genaro Liquori" but the caption 
to the papers that were actually filed name him as 
"Genaro Liguori." 
In order to forestall the need for a post-filing 
amendment to the caption that would have to relate 
back to the time of announcement, I wonder if you 
might see fit to make an appropriate correction. 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
P.S.--It pains me to admit it, but I find that I 
made the same mistake in my dissent. 
.. 
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